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The human cognitive system is a remarkable exemplar of a general intelli-
gent system whose competence is not confined to a specific problem domain.
Evidently, general cognitive competences are a product of a prolonged and
complex process of cognitive development. Therefore, the process of cognitive
development is a primary key to understanding the emergence of intelligent
behavior. This paper develops the theoretical foundations for a model that
generalizes the process of cognitive development. The model aims to pro-
vide a realistic scheme for the synthesis of scalable cognitive systems with
an open-ended range of capabilities. Major concepts and theories of human
cognitive development are introduced and briefly explored, focusing on the
enactive approach to cognition and the concept of sense-making. The initial
scheme of human cognitive development is then generalized by introducing
the philosophy of individuation and the abstract mechanism of transduction.
The theory of individuation provides the ground for the necessary paradig-
matic shift from cognitive systems as given products to cognitive develop-
ment as a formative process of self-organization. Next, the conceptual model
is specified as a scalable scheme of networks of agents. The mechanisms of
individuation are formulated in context-independent information theoretical
terms. Finally, the paper discusses two concrete aspects of the generative
model – mechanisms of transduction and value modulating systems. These
are topics of further research towards an implementable architecture.
Keywords: cognitive development, individuation, enaction, dynamic core hypothesis,
operational complexity, self-organization
†Both authors contributed equally to this work.
1
ar
X
iv
:1
41
1.
01
59
v2
  [
q-
bio
.N
C]
  1
3 D
ec
 20
14
Introduction
A primary goal of artificial general intelligence (AGI) research is the synthesis of a
machine capable of performing any intellectual task a human being is capable of and
eventually going beyond that. While artificial intelligence research which is problem
specific and context specific (e.g. understanding speech and text, visual pattern recog-
nition, robotic motion, various optimization problems, etc.) has lately made quite a
few impressive breakthroughs, artificial general intelligence research that aims to distill
the principles of intelligence independently of a specific problem domain or a predefined
context is still at its preliminary stages.
The goal of this paper is to present our approach to artificial general intelligence. We
frame intelligence in the operation of cognitive agents. The intelligence of a cognitive
agent is actualized as a set of competences enabling the agent to effectively respond to
problematic situations presented to it by the environment in the course of their interac-
tions. Normally, observing a cognitive system in its operation, we are able to identify
a specific problem domain (e.g. motion in a 3D environment), extract the behaviors by
which an agent addresses the problem, and create a model that represents these behav-
iors. The model, if successful, will capture the problem-specific intelligent mechanisms
involved and will allow us to apply these mechanisms to similar problems. In such an
approach, various organisms and primarily human agents are the exemplars and primary
research subjects of intelligent behavior.
In our investigation, we realized that this approach meets its limits when we aim
to understand how intelligent behaviors arise in the first place when an agent meets
a problematic situation it has not encountered before and therefore does not possess
the a priori knowledge of how to address it. Intelligent agents do not appear ready
made. Human agents, as one remarkable example, undergo a prolonged and complex
process of cognitive development till they become highly competent cognitive systems. If
established cognitive competences and their entailed behavioral patterns are the actual
manifestations of specific intelligence, it follows quite intuitively that the process of
cognitive development by which such cognitive competences arise, is the fulcrum of
general intelligence.
We argue, therefore, that the only effective way to understand general intelligence is
by building a model of cognitive development. We describe an abstract genetic1 process
that can be applied to any general cognitive systems such as biological organisms, human
agents, swarms, social systems, social institutions, robots, machine intelligences and
more.
Here, we present a descriptive model that we aim to further develop in the future
into a full generative one. The descriptive model provides the principles and conceptual
framework of synthetic cognitive development. The goal of the generative model will
be to apply our approach to the actual synthesis of systems capable of demonstrating
cognitive development, i.e. operating general intelligence in an environment which is not
a priori framed within a specific problem domain.
1Genetic in the sense of genesis.
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In the first section we specify our approach to cognition as the process of sense-
making and identify major characteristics of cognitive development in human agents. In
the second section we introduce Simondon’s theory of individuation as the philosophical
framework for our model. Using the theory of individuation, we depart from the specifics
of human cognitive development and re-frame it in a general systemic context. The third
section is a description of the conceptual model in information-theoretic terms. The
final section outlines future research directions by discussing major components of the
generative model.
1 Cognitive development and sense-making
The human mind is an exemplar of a cognitive system exhibiting a high degree of gener-
ality in its intelligence. In this section we aim to extract general principles of cognitive
development from research areas such as psychology, cognitive science, neuroscience,
social psychology, etc.
1.1 Human cognitive development
The concept of cognitive development has been defined in the field of psychology as
“the emergence of the ability to understand the world” (Schacter et al., 2010, p. 447).
Traditionally it is mostly associated with the child development stages proposed by Jean
Piaget but can be also applied to describe sense-making by an individual throughout its
whole lifetime as proposed by Kegan (1982). Piaget originally contended that children
pass through four eras of development - sensimotor, prelogical, concrete operational, and
formal operational - which can be further subdivided into stages and substages (Kohlberg
and Gilligan, 1971; Piaget, 2004) (see Table 1). Kegan also propounded that Piaget’s and
some later cognitive development theories generally describe recursive subject and object
relationships when the subject of previous stage becomes an object in the next stage,
to which he refers as an ‘evolution of meaning’. Subject in this context means whatever
is perceived as part of self while object is part of environment. Therefore cognitive
development can be understood as an ongoing balancing of subject – object relations and
interactions across the emerging boundary of an individual towards increasing cognitive
complexity2. This recursive process progressively defines a boundary of an individual
- a psychic differentiation of self from the other (Kegan, 1982, p. 24) which generally
constitutes the differentiation between agent and environment.
For further clarification of our understanding of cognitive development as individua-
tion and the benefits of such an approach, let us examine a schema of Era I of early
cognitive development as formulated by Piaget (Table 1). It is clear that every subse-
quent stage builds upon the previous one and together they seem to form a hierarchy. It
seems however that cognitive development theorists and practitioners, including Piaget,
2We formally define the general characteristic of operational complexity of an agent in 3.4. Cogni-
tive complexity is an operational complexity in the context of a cognitive system characterizing the
coupling of internal complexity of a cognitive agent with its environment
3
Stage 1. Reflex action.
Stage 2. Coordination of reflexes and sensorimotor repetition (primary circular
reaction).
Stage 3. Activities to make interesting events in the environment reappear (sec-
ondary circular reaction).
Stage 4. Means/ ends behavior and search for absent objects.
Stage 5. Experimental search for new means (tertiary circular reaction).
Stage 6. Use of imagery in insightful invention of new means and in recall of
absent objects and events.
Table 1: Era I (age 0-2): The era of sensorimotor intelligence. Adapted from (Kohlberg and Gilligan, 1971, p.
1063)
agree that stages in cognitive development overlap, occur in parallel or get manifested
later in the maturation process. Therefore we can approach the process of cognitive
development as both a sequence of stages and a continuum. In the next section we
will see that a developmental continuum punctuated by distinct stages is also supported
by understanding cognitive development as a case of individuation. The appearance of
stages of cognitive development seems to be better understood in terms of products of
individuation or ‘evolutionary truces’ as Kegan calls them.
1.2 Enaction
The enactive approach treats cognition as the adaptive process of interaction between
an agent and its environment. The distinction between agent and environment is con-
stituted by the interactions themselves. We define a cognitive system as a complex
adaptive system which is an organized network of interactive sub-processes (De Jaegher
and Di Paolo, 2007, p. 3) that together realize a network of objects and their relations
as they are perceived in the world.
A cognitive system cannot form itself separately from the matrix of interactions with
other entities within a larger population. In terms of social psychology this principle
is informed by a perspective that minds exist only as social products (Summers, 1994,
p. 328). Relationships and bonds with other entities of the population are part of the
cognitive system and thus define its identity on equal terms with internal relationships
and structures. Therefore, the mental states of an individual are not established prior
to the interaction, but are shaped, or even created, during its dynamics. Di Paolo and
De Jaegher (2012) describe these dynamics as participatory sense-making and propose
what they call the ‘Interactive Brain Hypothesis’ which “describes an extreme possibility,
namely that all social brain mechanisms depend on interactive elements either develop-
mentally or in the present, even in situations where there is no interaction” (Di Paolo
and De Jaegher, 2012, p. 5).
Also in some forms of psychotherapeutic theory and practice (e.g. Gestalt, the in-
terpersonal approach to psychoanalysis), certain interactions or situations which are
normally considered external to an individual are actually an integral part of its sense-
making processes. An individual enacts itself in its social milieu rather than merely using
internal representations, plans or theories of mind or even perceptual routines existing
4
prior to the interaction.
Edelman and Mountcastle (1982) define ‘world inputs’ and ‘self-inputs’ to differentiate
between interactions across and within the boundary of a neuronal group. We extend
this principle from the context of neuronal groups to networks of cognitive agents. An
individual is defined as a totality of both types of interactions while the proportions of
them may differ at different periods.
1.3 Sense-making
Sense-making is one of the components of the enactive approach to mind and cogni-
tion (De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007, p. 3). We understand cognition as a process
of individuation within a scope referred to by Piaget (2004) as ‘genetic epistemology’.
A psychologically oriented definition of sense-making is: sensemaking is a motivated,
continuous effort to understand connections (which can be among people, places, and
events) in order to anticipate their trajectories and act effectively in relation to them
(Klein et al., 2006, p. 3). From the perspective of dynamics of the cognitive system as
defined by us, sense-making is continuous effort to form a network of connections and
objects as they are perceived in the world. The enactive approach implies that cognition
and sense-making are seen not as something that happens inside clearly defined bound-
aries of the cognitive system but are the product of interactions (McGann, 2008, p. 1)
across emerging boundaries: “Sense-making establishes a perspective on the world with
its own normativity, which is a counterpart of the agent being a center of activity in the
world” (De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007, p. 4).
In the context of cognitive development, sense-making has the following notable as-
pects:
• Identity and identification. A prior notion of an entity ‘which is making sense’
seems to be needed, but in our framework it is not the case: the identity of cognitive
agents is created during the process.
• Enaction. According to (Clark, 2012, p. 6) perception is an action where an agent
produces a stream of expectations and then corrects its own model according to
incoming information. Therefore the primary component of sense-making is an
action: an agent acts upon the environment, catches the ‘reflection’ or response
and updates the internal representation of it.
• Reflexive. Sense-making is a two-way interaction between the individual and
its environment across the boundary being created during the same process: any
agents’ examination, modeling and action ‘bends’ the environment and affects
the perception of and further decisions by those same agents. The property of
reflexivity of the system captures these mutual influences of networks of processes
across the boundary of an agent.
• Participatory aspect. As noted by De Jaegher and Di Paolo, “mental states that
‘do’ the understanding and the ones to be understood are not fully independent
or established, but are instead affected, negotiated, and even created as a result
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of interaction dynamics” (Di Paolo and De Jaegher, 2012, p. 4). They describe
the set of possibilities arising from these dynamics with the notion of participatory
sense-making, emphasizing its social aspect. In section 3 we extend the social
aspect of sense-making across multiple scales (Figure 2).
1.4 Cognitive dissonance
The approach to cognitive development as a sequence of integration and disintegration
cycles of meaning is supported by several theories. Leon Festinger’s theory of cognitive
dissonance, developed in the 1950s, focuses on a state of mind holding two or more
elements of knowledge which are relevant but inconsistent with each other (Harmon-
Jones, 2012). It is arguably a normal state of an intelligent agent engaged in a life-long
activity of making sense of its environment. The theory proposes that incompatibility
of the elements create a state of discomfort or ‘dissonance’ which is proportional to the
degree of incompatibility - the lack of integration. Further Festinger hypothesized that
persons experience an arousal - usually unpleasant emotions - due to the dissonance
which motivates them to engage in ‘psychological work’ to reduce the inconsistency.
Cognitive dissonance theory in its original form generally enjoys experimental support.
Particularly interesting are experiments showing that during the state of dissonance
individuals evidence arousal and report negative affect (Harmon-Jones, 2012, p. 2).
Studies in cognitive neuroscience indicate a tendency of a cognitive system to choose a
single explanation of sensory experience by constraining multiple possibilities, thereby
reducing internal uncertainty or dissonance. For example, the entropic brain hypothesis
of Carhart-Harris et al. (2014) points to the association between perception of identity
and organized brain activity. The dynamic core hypothesis of Edelman and Tononi
(2000) likewise connects concepts of immediate consciousness with synchronized activity
of neuronal groups and areas in the neocortex.
These observations fit the sense-making concept indicating a tendency of the cognitive
system towards increased coherency both internally and in its relationships with the
environment. Nevertheless periods of reduced coherency are necessary for the cognitive
system in order to explore possibilities of the higher coherency – what we call cognitive
complexity in Figure 1.
1.5 Arousal and emotion
Contrary to the established scientific opinion of the end of 20th century, feelings and emo-
tions are just as cognitive as any other percepts (Damasio, 2008, p. 16) and their role
cannot be overlooked when considering the development of a cognitive system. While
currently the importance of emotions and feelings for the overall operation of a cognitive
system is increasingly accepted, the integration of an ‘emotional system’ into the model
of cognition is still problematic. Damasio (2008, p. 284) proposes a view of emotions as
an immense collection of changes occurring in both brain and body, usually prompted
by particular content while feeling as the conscious perception of those changes. This
proposal is strikingly similar to the two-factor theory of emotion by Schachter and Singer
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conceptualizing emotion as general arousal plus a cognitive label attached to it (Cooper,
2007, p. 58). The state of arousal starts a chain of events within an organism which
usually leads to the decrease of arousal. These events can take a form of internal ‘psy-
chological work’ (Harmon-Jones, 2012) or external actions in the environment, both of
which can be considered as sense-making activities. Further, (Damasio, 2008) differen-
tiates between primary emotions and secondary emotions. Primary emotions are ‘wired
from birth’ and constitute what is understood as drives and instincts. Secondary emo-
tions are acquired by creating systematic connections between primary emotions and
categories of objects and situations (Damasio, 2008, p. 151).
1.6 The scheme of cognitive development
Based on concepts discussed in this section we propose a scheme which conceptualizes
cognitive development as an observable sequence of integration and disintegration pro-
cesses progressively determining the cognitive complexity of an agent. The progressive
nature of cognitive development is manifested by increasing the capacity of sense-making.
This process does not follow a trajectory of monotonous adaptation but rather advances
in a punctuated manner going through relatively stable stages. The enactive nature of
sense-making implies a reflexive relation between system and environment. At every
state, both the cognitive system and the environment have more than one option to re-
late to each other. Therefore every state of the interaction is characterized by a unique
trade-off between freedom and constraints in choosing future trajectory development.
Additionally, system–environment boundaries are themselves subject to variation. We
suggest that this freedom–constraint trade-off in humans is closely associated with the
level of experienced cognitive dissonance. The system achieves higher levels of cogni-
tive complexity via periodic fluctuations in its level of cognitive dissonance. When the
cognitive dissonance of the system is low, it undergoes constrained periods of devel-
opment with more predictable developmental trajectory. When cognitive dissonance is
high, the future trajectory of the system becomes more divergent. Our hypothesis is
that emotions are mechanisms that guide the selection of the developmental trajectories
of the cognitive system by modulating the sensitivity of the system to environmental
stimuli. We generalize these mechanisms in our synthetic cognitive development model
by introducing value systems that modulate the global developmental activity.
Figure 1 is a scheme of cognitive development as a variation of cognitive dissonance
versus coherence of a system which can be mapped to certain cycles. These cycles emerge
from the attempt to balance opposing tendencies to suppress the unpredictability of the
cognitive system on the one hand and keep it open to change on the other.
Human cognitive development is usually understood as a predictable and finite se-
quence of developmental stages. We argue that both the predictability and finiteness of
cognitive development are not ingrained or necessary properties of the process but rather
constitute historically shaped superficial characteristics. For example, the relative sta-
bility of observable stages of child development are related to more or less stable external
influences of parents, peers and society as well as to genetic predispositions. Likewise,
the fact that mature individuals rarely undergo transitions to higher levels of cognitive
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Figure 1: A scheme of cognitive development qualitatively visualizing the dependency of increasing cog-
nitive complexity on the variation in the level of cognitive dissonance of a system. The bold curve
represents actual developmental trajectory. Circles with numbers represent states of development,
arbitrarily chosen for illustration. States (1), (3), (7) and (9) mark high cognitive dissonance states
where the system has the highest possibility of ‘choice’ between alternative developmental trajecto-
ries. Dashed lines are drawn at stage (7) to illustrate multiple possible trajectories that are actually
present at every point along the developmental trajectory. States (2), (4), (5) and (8) mark stable
periods when the operation of a cognitive system is constrained. Stages 1, 2, 3 and 4 on the horizontal
axis illustrate cognitive development stages as described by the developmental psychology representing
punctuated manner of increase in cognitive complexity.
development is possibly related to reduced environmental pressures to engage in the
‘psychological work’ involved. The rationale of seeing cognitive development beyond its
observable predictability and finiteness is instrumental for the framework of synthetic
cognitive development which aims to describe the genesis of a general cognitive agency
as a continuous individuation process, which is the focus of the following section.
2 Cognitive development and individuation
Following the embodied-enactive approach in its broadest sense, cognition is the bringing
forth of a world of objects and entities and the relations among them. Bringing forth a
world is first and foremost about interacting in it. Perception, action, thought and other
cognitive activities are only aspects of this all-encompassing interaction. We can say
that cognition, therefore is the bringing forth of individuals, both subjects and objects,
and their relations. What an individual is and how individuals come into existence are
questions that we address in the context of understanding cognition and cognitive devel-
opment. As a starting point, an individual is known by that property(ies) or quality(ies)
by virtue of which it is unique or describable as such. What define individuals there-
fore, are distinctions and boundaries the formation of which is a primal activity that
precedes even the notion of individual. The nature of distinctions and boundaries is
subtle; inasmuch as they separate subject from object, figure from background and one
individual from another, they must also connect that which they separate. A boundary,
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therefore, is not only known by the separation it establishes but also by the interactions
and relations it facilitates.
Following the premise that cognition is the bringing forth of individuals, our interest
in cognitive development led us to the interesting conjecture that cognitive development
can be understood in terms of how individuals come into existence in the first place, or
in other words, to their individuation. As we aim to establish principles of synthetic
cognitive development, we find this shift in focus from individuals to individuation;
from given identities to their generative processes, both necessary and philosophically
profound.
2.1 Individuation - a brief philosophical introduction
To have a preliminary grasp of the concept of individuation, we need to briefly review
the importance of individuals in the way we describe the world. The philosophical tra-
dition that started in ancient Greece, and particularly with Aristotle’s metaphysics, sees
the world as made of individual beings with a given stable identity. What defines an
individual is a set of stable qualities. The principle of the excluded middle posited by
Aristotle ensures that an individual cannot possess a certain property while simultane-
ously not possess it. Hence, the identity of individuals, according to Aristotelian theory,
is unambiguously defined. To account for the genesis of individuals, according to this
theory, we need to identify a principle(s) and the specific initial conditions of its opera-
tion that together bring forth the individual. For example, planet earth is an individual
object. To account for its individuation, astrophysicists have come up with a theory
about the formation of planets and the necessary conditions for planets to form, i.e. the
existence of a star such as the solar system. Inasmuch as this scheme makes sense, it
suffers a major weakness: it only shows how individuals (planets) are formed from other
individuals, i.e. certain necessary conditions that are given a priori and an individual
principle – a stable theory of planets formation – being followed. Clearly, in the very
way we commonly think, individuals are primary ontological elements and individua-
tion is only secondary (Weinbaum, 2014). From the Aristotelian theory of individuals,
it follows therefore that we must always assume a fully formed individual prior to any
individuation. This theory, however, is not very helpful for generalization of our scheme
of cognitive development.
Gilbert Simondon was the first to criticize in depth the classical treatment of individ-
uation and the majority of his writings (Simondon, 2005) are dedicated to developing a
new philosophy of individuation. In (Simondon, 2009) he explains:
“Individuation has not been able to be adequately thought and described
because previously only one form of equilibrium was known–stable equilib-
rium. Metastable equilibrium was not known; being was implicitly supposed
to be in a state of stable equilibrium. However, stable equilibrium excludes
becoming, because it corresponds to the lowest possible level of potential
energy; it is the equilibrium that is reached in a system when all of the pos-
sible transformations have been realized and no more force exists. All the
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potentials have been actualized, and the system having reached its lowest
energy level can no longer transform itself. Antiquity knew only instability
and stability, movement and rest; they had no clear and objective idea of
metastability.”
In Simondon’s new theory of individuation, we are encouraged to understand the indi-
vidual from the perspective of the process of individuation rather than the other way
around (Simondon, 1992). The individual is a metastable phase in a process and is
always in possession of not yet actualized and not yet known potentialities of being.
Simondon adds:
“Individuation must therefore be thought of as a partial and relative res-
olution manifested in a system that contains latent potentials and harbors a
certain incompatibility within itself, an incompatibility due at once to forces
in tension as well as to the impossibility of interaction between terms of
extremely disparate dimensions.”
According to Simondon, an individual is not anymore a rigid unity with ultimately
given properties but rather a plastic entity in a metastable state punctuated by events
of transformation. Every such event reconfigures the system of tensions and the manner
by which they will determine further transformations. This description is aligned with
our understanding of cognitive development as the continuous resolution of cognitive
dissonance (see 1.6).
2.2 The preindividual
In their process of individuation, individuals are not preceded by already individuated
entities or principles that instruct the trajectory of their formation but by a state of af-
fairs which is yet undetermined – the preindividual. Even after an individual has reached
a relatively stable state, the preindividual is not exhausted and persists in the individual.
This is what allows its subsequent individuation or becoming. The unity characteristic
of fully individuated beings (i.e. identities) which warrants the application of the prin-
ciple of the excluded middle, cannot be applied to the preindividual. The preindividual
goes beyond unity and identity. Deleuze, whose seminal work Difference and Repetition
draws on many of Simondon’s insights, would later describe the preindividual as “deter-
minable but not yet determined” and individuation basically proceeds as its “progressive
determination”(Deleuze, 1994; Weinbaum, 2014).
Simondon also emphasizes that relations between individuals undergo individuation
too: “A relation does not spring up between two terms that are already separate indi-
viduals, rather, it is an aspect of the internal resonance of a system of individuation. It
forms a part of a wider system.” (Simondon, 2009, p. 8) In particular, individuation
never brings to light an individual in a vacuum but rather an individual-milieu dyad.
This dyad contains both a system of distinctions and a system of relations. The individ-
ual and its milieu reciprocally determine each other as they develop as a system wider
than the individual.
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2.3 Metastability
Understanding Simondon’s concept of the preindividual – the dynamic situation that
both precedes and is immanent to individuals – is based on his particular notion of
metastability. In systems dynamics, the system’s states can be mapped into an energy
plane where each state is represented by a point on a N-dimensional plane and is assigned
a scalar number designating the energy of the system at that state. A stable state of
the system is a state characterized by low energy value relative to neighboring states. If
the system is perturbed from a state of stability it will often (depending on the size of
perturbation) reach a state of slightly higher energy and will tend to immediately return
to the initial state of lower energy. A metastable system is normally a system with a few
local minima. Given strong enough perturbations a metastable system may move among
states of local stability and hence the designation that implies that no single state is truly
stable. It is easy to notice that the topography of the energy landscape here is given
and the system dynamics only moves among the already determined set of stable states.
Clearly, this representation will only fit an already individuated system. Simondon’s
notion of metastability departs from this scheme in that the relations between variables
in a preindividual condition are not yet determined and the whole landscape is dynamic.
As the individuating system moves from state to state, the topography of the landscape
changes and may settle into a stable shape only as the state variables mutually determine
their relations3. Importantly, the dynamics of a metastable system is not determined a
priori but rather individuates along with its structure in a sequence of transitions.
2.4 Transduction
One of the most significant innovations in Simondon’s theory is the concept of transduc-
tion. Transduction is the abstract mechanism of individuation, an activity which takes
place in the preindividual. Classical logic and procedural descriptions cannot be used to
think about individuation, because they require the usage of concepts and relationships
among concepts that only apply to the results of the operation of individuation (Simon-
don, 2009, pp. 10). Transduction comes to designate, therefore, a new model of thought
that is constructed from a genetic (as in ‘genesis’) point of view. Combes (2013) writes:
“Simondon ‘transgresses’ the Kantian limits on reason.[...] Such an approach appears to
offer a reinterpretation of the thesis of Parmenides, wherein ‘The same, itself, is at once
thinking and being’ [...].” That thought and being (in the sense of individuals brought
forth) are considered the same from the standpoint of the mechanism of individuation,
highlights how transduction presents a significant contribution to the philosophical un-
derstanding of cognitive development. Cognitive development is a formative process
where both subject and object are individuated. This individuation produces knowledge
– a resolution, at least a partial one, of an incompatibility (i.e. unresolved tensions)
which preexists subject-object differentiation. For Simondon, the conditions of knowl-
edge and of cognition are not given a priori. We can therefore conceive of cognitive
development without any inherent limits.
3This settlement is also mentioned in an above quote as the resolution of incompatibilities.
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Simondons adds on transduction: “One could, without a doubt, affirm that transduc-
tion cannot be presented as a model of logical procedure having the value of a proof.
Indeed, we do not wish to say that transduction is a logical procedure in the current
sense of the term; it is a mental process, and even more than a process, it is a functioning
of the mind that discovers [emphasis added]. This functioning consists of following being
in its genesis, in carrying out the genesis of thought at the same time as the genesis of
the object. ” (Simondon, 2009, pp. 11) (see also p. 14 below).
It is beyond the scope of this article to provide an in-depth review of transduction –
especially of its psychic and social dimensions – but we will give here the highlights that
are essential to our approach to cognitive development. Simondon initially defines the
concept as follows:
“By transduction we mean an operation–physical, biological, mental, social–
by which an activity propagates itself from one element to the next, within a
given domain, and founds this propagation on a structuration of the domain
that is realized from place to place: each area of the constituted structure
serves as the principle and the model for the next area, as a primer for its
constitution, to the extent that the modification expands progressively at
the same time as the structuring operation. A crystal that, from a very
small seed, grows and expands in all directions in its supersaturated mother
liquid provides the most simple image of the transductive operation: each
already constituted molecular layer serves as an organizing basis for the layer
currently being formed.” (Simondon, 2009, pp. 11)
Here are a few points that can be extracted from this definition:
The dynamics of transduction Clearly, transduction is reminiscent of the concept of
self-organization both in its reference to stability and metastability and in the
emergence of structure in a process of relaxing a system of tensions4. Individu-
ation will take place as long as the system has not reached a final stability and
exhausted its potential for change. But in fact final stability is only an idealization
because it requires a closed system that does not interact with its environment, or
is not distinct from its environment (thermodynamic equilibrium). Open systems
that maintain at least some distance from equilibrium, or are far from equilibrium,
like living organisms and ecosystems, can be considered as continuously individu-
ating. Transduction, however, goes further than the formal understanding of self-
organization in addressing complex situations that are more difficult to represent
in terms of energy or information exchanges. While self-organization commonly
describes the convergence of trajectories towards attractors within an already con-
figured state-space, transduction does not presume such an a priori configuration
that is characteristic only of already individuated systems.
Transduction is said to take place when two systems which are initially incom-
patible come to interact with each other. Simondon uses two terms to explain
4We use here tension (or intensity) as a general term for energetic differences that drive structural and
state changes in a system. See DeLanda (2013, chap 2).
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incompatibility or unresolved tensions: the first is disparity which refers to two
elements that initially do not share any common ground. The second term is prob-
lematic in the sense that two systems pose a problem for each other that needs
some resolution. For example: the problem the environment poses for an organism
which requires it to either adapt or change the environment. The resulting inter-
action is a transductive process that drives the individuation of both organism and
environment. In the course of their interactions, the outcome of which is initially
undetermined, they form certain relations of resonance or reciprocal determina-
tion by one constraining the dynamics of the other. When such process achieves
a relative stability an organization or a structural pattern emerges as the individ-
ual. Both initial systems have changed and they now present a pattern of (more or
less) regulated interaction that also highlights a distinct boundary. This resolution
however is never complete. The remaining unresolved aspects of the interaction
are those that maintain the preindividual being within the formed individual and
will eventually drive further individuation.
Structure and operation Perhaps the most important aspect revealed in transduction is
the progressive co-determination of structure and function (see also above regard-
ing the notion of metastability). Individuation can be seen as a chain of operations
O on structures S: S → O → S → O → S... (Combes, 2013, p. 14-15). Every
operation is a conversion of one structure into another, while every structure me-
diates between one operation and another. Each structure in the chain constrains
the operations that can immediately follow. Each operation can transform the
previous structure into a limited number of new structures. Every intermediate
structure is a partial resolution of incompatibility but it is driven away from its
relative stability as long as the existing tensions are not exhausted. This is reminis-
cent of the propagation of a computation in evolutionary programming. Executed
code and the data are analogous to operation and structure. But the code itself
is also data that can be progressively modified to produce inexhaustible variety
and innovation. This analogy helps us understand how operation and structure
are reciprocally determining expressions of the transductive process.
Transduction and information Simondon’s concept of information is substantially dif-
ferent from that of Shannon’s theory of information (Shannon, 2001). Shannon’s
model of communication seeks to reproduce “at one point either exactly or ap-
proximately a message selected at another point.” For this, one must presuppose
an agreed upon system of encoded messages and the means of their exchange
that is already individuated. Simondon’s information precedes the individual. He
seeks to describe information itself as existing in a state of metastability and inde-
terminacy. According to him “information must never be reduced to signals” but
instead, must express the compatibility of two disparate realms (Iliadis, 2013). The
partial compatibility or coherence that is achieved during transduction is expressed
as the emergence of information in the sense of mediating forms or operations. In
Simondon’s words:
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“Information is therefore a primer for individuation; it is a demand
for individuation, for the passage from a metastable system to a stable
system; it is never a given thing. There is no unity and no identity of in-
formation, because information is not a term; (...) Information can only
be inherent to a problematic; it is that by which the incompatibility of
the non-resolved system becomes an organizing dimension in the reso-
lution;(...) Information is the formula of individuation, a formula that
cannot exist prior to this individuation. An information can be said
to always be in the present, current, because it is the direction [sens]
according to which a system individuates itself.” (Simondon, 2009, pp.
10)
In the context of cognitive development, the individuation of objects necessarily
entails the individuation of exchanged signals and their signification across different
scales of organization.
Transduction and logic To further highlight the ontogenetic characteristic of transduc-
tion, Simondon compares the process to the logical operations of both deduction
and induction. Transduction is not deductive since it does not posit a given prin-
ciple(s) or pattern(s) external to the process that can instruct the resolution of
the present situation. Deduction can only highlight that which is already given by
fully individuated knowledge. Transduction discovers relations that did not exist
before. Furthermore, transduction is not inductive in the sense that it does not
extract those aspects of the incompatible terms that are nevertheless common to
them, thereby eliminating what is unique to them. Instead, “[T]ransduction is, on
the contrary, a discovery of dimensions of which the system puts into communi-
cation [...] each of its terms, and in such a way that the complete reality of each
of the terms of the domain can come to order itself without loss, without reduc-
tion, in the newly discovered structures.” (Simondon, 2009, pp. 12) Transduction,
therefore, is a real resolution of difference through mediation and not reduction to
some common denominator. Following this understanding, we argue that cogni-
tive development is beyond what is reachable by a deterministic logical process.
Only after we make sense of something can it become available to the faculties of
rational thinking.
3 Cognitive development in information-theoretic terms
To substantiate our approach to synthetic cognitive development as a process of indi-
viduation, the goal of this section is to describe a conceptual model of self-organized
boundary formation. We use an information theoretic approach to formalize the dy-
namic emergence of agents. For the sake of clarity of description, some of the terms here
are didactically described from the perspective of an external observer. For example, we
describe a distinction between an agent and its environment, or assume distinct states
in the operation of agents prior to specifying how such distinctions arise in an actual
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process of individuation. Such descriptions are not instrumental to the actual processes;
they are given only as a necessary descriptive scaffolding.
3.1 Concepts and terms
Agents and boundaries
Let us first consider a heterogeneous population P of N agents that are capable of ex-
changing information via interconnections. Each agent has a set of input and output
connections to other agents so that they together form a network which reflects a topol-
ogy of information exchanges. For simplicity we assume for the moment that each agent
realizes a state machine with an internal state and input and output vectors. Input
information is processed depending on the current internal state to produce an output
and possibly change the internal state of the agent. We also assume that all the agents
in the population are relatively stable in their behavior. As will become clearer in the
following, the state machine description of the agent is only a schematic representation
and does not reflect the actual structure of the agent.
In the course of individuation, P is differentiated by self-organizing into two subsets
U and E. The subset U operates in relation to subset E as an environment that pro-
vides a repertoire of changing signals. Some of the agents in U can sense changes in the
environment E (sensors) while others can introduce effects in the environment (actua-
tors). As we consider self-organized boundary formation, prior to such formation, P is a
pre-individual undifferentiated population. The division of P into U and E is in fact the
product of an actual individuation process which will be specified by a complementary
generative model. Here we only specify the initial and final stages of the process.
Heterogeneity and Redundancy of P
The agents of population P are heterogeneous and redundant. Each agent in the popu-
lation receives input signals and produces output signals that depend on its inputs and
internal state. The transfer functions (i.e. input/output relations) of agents form a con-
tinuum of behaviors which account for the heterogeneity of the population. In addition
to the variety of behaviors, there is an additional variety in the way each behavior is
realized by agents with similar transfer functions. This accounts for the population’s
redundancy. Seen by an external observer, the behaviors of agents can be loosely clas-
sified into various functions such as sensors, actuators, filters, integrators, logical gates
etc. But as our model focuses on individuation, the particular transfer functions do not
matter. What matters is the generative process that organizes the population or parts
of it into a coordinated whole where distinctions and coherent relations emerge. Both
the heterogeneity and redundancy of the population are essential to the selective mech-
anisms that drive the process of individuation and will be further discussed in section
4.
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Individuation
Our goal is to model cognitive development as the process of individuation described
in section 2. Specifically, we aim to model the process by which a subset U of P
self-organizes and differentiates itself from E = P − U thus giving rise to a boundary
and an individual–milieu distinction. The outcome of this process is a new individual
agent5 A whose function is realized by the coordinated and synchronized operations of
its constituent agents belonging to U that are reciprocally selected from P . The term
reciprocally selected here means that agents in the population spontaneously select each
other, as they interact, to form coordinated coalitions without the intervention of an
external guiding agency. As already mentioned in section 2, the produced individuals
are never final products. Changes in the environment may bring about changes in the
structure and function of the emergent agent. Moreover, every such agent A, once
emerging, may disintegrate altogether. That is why the stability of the structure and
function of agents in our model is only a relative stability. In fact, all agents are dynamic
constructs.
Scales of individuation
In our model, individuation is a scalable process that takes place at multiple scales, both
structural and functional, of the individuating system. We describe the model at some
scale S, where we observe a population of agents Ps. Every agent in Ps is a product of
self-organization of simpler agents at the lower scale S − 1. Similarly, super-agents Ais
that emerge at scale S are the elements at the higher scale S + 1. The individuation of
agents, therefore, is taking place simultaneously at multiple scales. In most cases, lower
scale agents must have more stable properties than higher scale agents. Instability of
agents at lower scales would make higher level organization much less probable.
Scales differ not only structurally but also temporally. As the cognitive system indi-
viduates, complex objects emerge and their frequency of interactions become slower in
comparison to their lower scale components. Generally, therefore, the relative frequency
of interactions at scale S is slower than the rate of change at scales lower than S and
faster than the frequency of interactions at scales higher than S. It is helpful, therefore,
to understand the time scale associated with population Ps as the average duration of
interactions within the population.
5In the following it will become clear that more than one integrated agent can emerge in the process.
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Figure 2: Relationship among scales, populations and boundaries in the model. The chosen scale of analysis
is S. S + 1 is the higher scale while S − 1 is the lower scale. Ps denotes a population of agents at
scale S. Solid circles denote the agents of population P at any scale. Dashed lined circles denote
super-agents at any scale e.g. – As at the center of the figure, denotes a super-agent that emerges
from the interactions of agents in Ps. Super-agents at scale S are the agents of the population Ps+1.
The i − th super-agent at scale S is denoted Ais, the superscript is omitted if unneeded. Also, the
subscript S is omitted from A or P in the text if it is redundant.
Following Simondon’s understanding of information (see 2.4), as new individuals Ais
emerge at scale S, new information is being created. This information is expressed in
the structural and functional distinctions that become apparent at that scale. Whatever
remains incompatible among the agents of the lower scale does not get expressed in the
emergent new structures. Across multiple scales of individuation, these incompatibilities
remain as the preindividual in their respective scales.
As we will see in 3.4, the emergence of a new individuated organization at scale S is
accounted for in the reduction of entropy at the lower scale. But the new individuation(s)
do not correspond to merely the entropy now calculated at a higher scale, but to the
internal complexity Cintrn expressed in equation 6. The reason behind this difference is
that the new individuals at scale S retain some incompatibility which is not resolved.
They are therefore not ultimately organized, thus exhausting any further individuation.
Cintrn takes into account the actual compatibility (in terms of mutual information)
between the constituting agents and not merely the maximal repertoire of states they
can present. This ‘internal coherence’ expressed by Cintrn can indeed be associated with
the amount of preindividual information that turns into a new individuated form.
3.2 Definition and formation of boundaries
In our model, the boundaries defining the agent – environment distinction and the
relations between them – are never entirely fixed. The functioning of any emergent
agent is adaptive and subject to changes. We follow the work of Giulio Tononi and his
concept of information integration to formally define coordinated clusters in networks
of interacting agents (Tononi, 2004, 2008; Edelman and Tononi, 2000). The reasoning
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behind the concept is that if we examine a population P of pi interconnected agents,
where i ∈ [1, .., N ], we wish to quantify how much they affect and are being affected
by each other. In information theoretic terminology, each agent pi can either change its
state independently of all other agents in P , or its state may depend on the states of
other agents in P , or even be entirely determined by the states of other agents. The
mutual information between two agents pi, pj is given by the formula:
MI(pi, pj) = H(pi)−H(pi/pj) = H(pj)−H(pj/pi) (1)
= H(pi) + H(pj)−H(pi, pj) (2)
Where H(x) is the entropy involved in the state of agent x. If pi and pj are indepen-
dent, H(pi, pj) = H(pi)+H(pj) and then MI(pi, pj) would be 0. The mutual information
would be maximum in the case that the state of one agent is fully determined by the
other. In this case the mutual information will be equal to min(H(pi), H(pj)).
For a set of agents pi in P the integration of the whole set would be given by the sum
of the entropies of the independent agents pi minus the entropy of the joint set P :
I(P ) =
k∑
i=1
H(pi)−H(P ) (3)
In order to compare the degree of integration within a subset of agents to the integra-
tion between the said subset and the rest of the population, we divide the population of
agents P into two subgroups of differing sizes: Xki and its complement P −Xki , where
k is the number of agents in the subset X. The mutual information between Xki and its
complement is:
MI(Xki , P −Xki ) = H(Xki ) + H(P −Xki )−H(P ) (4)
Formula 4 measures the statistical dependence between a chosen subset i of k agents
and the rest of the population. The Cluster Index CI of the subset Xki will therefore be
given by:
CI(Xki ) = I(X
k
i )/MI(X
k
i , P −Xki ) (5)
CI measures the degree of distinctiveness of a subset of agents in P compared to the
whole population in terms of information exchange6. For CI ≤ 1 there is no significant
distinctiveness while a subset with CI  1 indicates a distinct integrated cluster.
Equipped with this comparative measure, we can compute the subset Xkmax of maxi-
mal size kmax < N in P with the highest cluster index that does not include subsets with
a higher cluster index. This subset will be designated as the primary functional cluster
PFCp(t) of population P at time t. The primary functional cluster corresponds to the
super-agent A, while the set of its constituent agents corresponds to U (see 3.1). The
definition of functional clusters makes concrete the differentiation between an agent and
its environment. Considering the relevant rate of information exchange in the population
6It is important to note that these are only simplified formulas that do not take into account the
different sizes of subsets.
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P , the computation involved can repeat itself in appropriate time intervals to yield a
time series of PFCs. In other words, the boundaries of the primary functional cluster
of P and the particular agents participating in it vary in time.
3.3 The dynamic core
The time-dependent primary functional cluster PFC(t) will be the one corresponding to
the super-agent A brought forth by P . The dynamic entity thus created was termed by
Edelman and Tononi (2000, chap. 12) the dynamic core. However, our usage of the term
is not confined to modeling the central nervous system. In the simplified case above we
consider that P produces at any given moment only a single super-agent but clearly this
is almost never the case. Actually P can give rise to a number of emergent integrated
agents. Such agents can be identified by recursively repeating the above computation
on P to yield a set of functional clusters (PFCp(t), FC
1
p(t), FC
2
p(t), ..., FC
m
p (t))
7. The
members of such a set are all distinguishable in terms of their integration relative to
their environment as long as their clustering index CI is significantly greater than 1.
In the simple case however the PFCp(t) is the individuated agent and the rest of P is
considered its environment E. We also assume that PFCp(t) is relatively slow-changing
in time compared to the rate of information exchange between the agents that constitute
it, but still it can present a rich repertoire of states due to both its interactions across
the boundary and the interactions of agents inside its boundaries.
A functional cluster (Figure 3a) is a set of agents which exhibit a synchronized activity
for a limited duration. Functional clusters reveal integrated structural and functional
properties of the network and are snapshots (PFCp(t = 1), PFCp(t = 2), ...) of a con-
tinuous process of agents exchanging information with each other i.e. the dynamic
core. The dynamic core’s boundary drift can be observed as the temporal sequence of
functional clusters (Figure 3b). Remarkably, the dynamic core is defined in terms of
interactions among agents, rather than merely in terms of their topological or functional
relations (Edelman and Tononi, 2000, p. 159).
7See (Edelman and Tononi, 2000, chap. 14) for discussion of multiple functional clusters.
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Figure 3: Top figure (a): PFCp(t) developing along three consecutive snapshots in time. The boundary of the
clusters moves from top right of the population to bottom right. The sequence of primary functional
clusters depends on connectivity patterns, which results in the observed drift of the boundary. At the
level of super-agent A’s interaction with its environment, the given example of the drift of boundary
illustrates a non-trivial response of PFCp(t = 3) through Xout to a stimulus acquired by PFCp(t = 1)
through Xin. Bottom figure (b): the dynamic core interacting with its environment during five
consecutive snapshots.
3.4 Operational complexity
A major characteristic of functional clusters pointed out by Edelman and Tononi (2000,
chap. 11) is their complexity. Considering an agent as an integrated functional cluster,
the complexity of the agent quantifies how differentiated are the agent’s inner states, or,
in other words, how many different states it can activate. Complexity is closely related
to integration. If all the agents of a cluster had operated independently from each other,
the cluster could have been said to have the highest complexity as its entropy would
have been maximized. But then, with CI  1 such a cluster is not a cluster at all
but a collection of independent agents. Similarly, at the other extreme, a very high
integration means very few possible states of the overall cluster, or, in other words, the
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states of individual agents of the cluster are mostly determined by global states. In
such a case H(PFCp) approaches zero. The complexity of functional clusters therefore
depends on the entropy of subsets within the cluster and the mutual information among
them. Let X be a PFC of size M in the original population P . We assume that X is
isolated from its environment8 so its inner states are self produced. We divide X into
two complementary subsets Xkj and X −Xkj of respective sizes k and M − k. The index
j, enumerates all possible subsets of size k out of X. The internal complexity of the
cluster X can be given by:
Cintrn(X) =
M/2∑
k=1
< MI(Xkj , X −Xkj ) > (6)
where the mutual information is averaged on all subsets of size k. Clearly, subsets of
very small size will contribute very little to Cintrn(X), while subsets of sizes in the
vicinity of M/2 will contribute the most complexity. Remarkably, Cintrn measure of
complexity is based only on the extent to which subsets of the cluster affect each other
and the statistical properties of the signals that agents within the cluster exchange.
Cintrn therefore does not rely on an arbitrary measure of complexity imposed from
outside the cluster.
To complete the picture, we consider two special subsets of the cluster X. Xin is the
subset of the agents that receives signals from the environment across the boundary of
the cluster (i.e. sensors), while Xout is the subset of agents that transmits signals to the
environment across the boundary (i.e. actuators). Xin and Xout can of course overlap.
Two additional useful quantified characteristics of a functional cluster is the degree to
which it can be affected by its environment and the degree to which it can affect the
environment. If the environment is defined as all the agents in P which do not belong
to X = PFCp then we can define the environment as: E = P − PFCp. While holding
the states of all the agents in X − Xin in constant state, we can compute the input
complexity as:
Cin(X) = MI(X
in, E) (7)
Similarly, the output complexity can be computed by holding X − Xout in a constant
state:
Cout(X) = MI(X
out, E) (8)
Finally, the overall interactive complexity can be given by the mutual information of
PFCp and E when nothing is held constant:
Cio = MI(X,E) (9)
These are of course simplified formulas that do not take into account the time depen-
dencies of X,E,Xin, Xout and the variation in the dynamics of Xin, Xout that may arise
from the different instantiations of the parts that are held constant in the computation.
Nevertheless, even with these simplified formulations, the clustering index CI together
8The cluster can be initialized to some arbitrary initial condition.
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with the various complexity measures Cintrn, Cin, Cout and Cio inform us about the gen-
eral characteristics of the emerging super-agent and its dynamics. Cintrn, for example,
may indicate the memory capacity of the agent; the more integrated internal states are,
the more ‘experience’ the agent can potentially draw from in its interactions.
4 Towards a generative model
In this section we outline the foundations of a generative model for cognitive develop-
ment. By generative model we mean an implementable architecture that will demon-
strate scalable cognitive development in terms that we described above, i.e. processes of
self-organized differentiation, boundary formation and object relations. We identify two
general mechanisms that are essential to our model, namely the transductive mechanism
and the value modulating system.
The basic architecture of our cognitive development model is a heterogeneous popu-
lation of agents that interact via links, thus forming a network. Information exchanges
among agents result in the self-organization of clusters of agents that synchronize and
coordinate their activities. Such self-organized clusters operate as distinct agents at a
higher scale of organization. The most elementary formative processes in our model are
the creation, reinforcement, suppression and destruction of links among agents. These
formative processes are guided by the nature of exchanges among agents, e.g. Hebbian
reinforcement rules in neural nets. All higher level formative mechanisms in our model
are constituted from these elementary processes and their modulation.
4.1 Transduction
The mechanisms that are responsible for the formation of boundaries and the bringing
forth of coordinated activities in a population of agents P arise primarily from the agents’
intrinsic capabilities to affect and be affected by each other. The specific characteristics
of the interactions, e.g. their frequency, their synchronization and coherence, have a
critical influence on the way agents are connected. Such influence finds its expression
in the reinforcement or suppression of connections among agents and consequently on
how strongly they may actually affect each other. This is how the activity of agents
within P progressively determines the topological organization of the network of agents
in P . The structural organization, in turn, affects the overall function of the individual
agents by selecting interactions. This recursive process of activity-determining structure
and structure-determining activity is described in 2.4 as transduction9 – the driving
mechanism of individuation.
Individuation is described as taking place when two incompatible systems interact
and achieve a certain degree of compatibility. In the generative model that we develop,
agents in population P interact and mutually select other agents with whom they are
compatible. The connections between compatible agents are reinforced while other con-
nections tend to be suppressed. In the course of such recursive selective interactions,
9Deleuze uses the term progressive determination to describe the same process. See,Weinbaum (2014).
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groups of compatible agents cluster into distinct compound organizations resulting in
individuated super-agents. What needs to be further clarified is the criteria for com-
patibility utilized in the selective process and the actual mechanism of reflexive mutual
selection taking place among agents.
Criteria for compatibility
Agents overcome their initial incompatibility by constraining each others’ regimen of
behaviors. In other words, there is a process of reflexive selection going on where every
agent selects with which other agents in the population it can interact. We present
here three understandings of the concept of compatibility from the simpler to the more
complex. A concrete selective criterion of the adaptation of link strengths among agents
is derived accordingly from each understanding:
Synchronization – Agents that produce effects (become active) at the same time will
tend to reinforce their connections.10 The kind of compatibility that is selected
by this criterion is temporal coincidence, which may indicate with some proba-
bility that the synchronized agents are causally affected by either the same event
or by events that are causally connected, or events that are otherwise correlated.
The formation of synchronized clusters of agents is the simplest form of individ-
uation. Synchronized groups will tend to reinforce their synchronized behaviors
and suppress their out-of-sync behaviors. Examples of individuation following this
criterion can be found in neural networks. The Hebbian rule that neurons that fire
together also wire together is one application of this criterion. A more complex
application is provided by Edelman and Tononi (2000) who hypothesize that spon-
taneous synchronization among groups of neurons is the basis of consciousness.11
From the perspective of our approach, both are examples of cognitive development
at the scale of groups of neurons.
Coherence – Agents that produce effects (become active) in response to informative
patterns (not necessarily synchronized) that represent the same category or type,
or a group of mutually supporting logical propositions, or a group of associative
patterns, will tend to reinforce their connections. The kind of compatibility that
is selected by this criterion is much more abstract then synchronization and re-
quires a context of operation. The agents connecting according to this criterion
form coherent clusters. Clearly, in this general form, the coherence criterion is
underspecified. Coherence will normally operate as a selective criterion only in
populations of relatively complex agents where the information that agents ex-
change already signify lower level individuated objects. Such objects provide the
context that further determines what coherence means. Thagard (2002) explains
coherency as the joint property of propositions that tend to be selected together
or rejected together when tested in the context of a certain domain or state of
affairs. In our case, Thagard’s understanding of coherence distills a second kind of
10This does not exclude the formation of new links as well.
11See also Tononi et al. (1992) for a more detailed description.
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compatibility, which we can generally describe as compatibility in signification or
meaning.12
Coordination – Coordination is broadly defined as functional compatibility. In fact,
synchronization and coherence can be described as special cases of coordination.
Agents that interact, process information and produce effects that jointly real-
ize a function or a goal are said to coordinate their operations, thus presenting
functional compatibility. Connections among agents that support the coordinated
activities will be reinforced while those that disturb the coordinated activities will
be suppressed. The agents connecting according to this criterion will form coordi-
nated clusters. As in coherence, coordination will operate as a selective criterion
only in populations of relatively complex agents and where the information that
agents exchange already signifies lower level individuated objects and their rela-
tions. Such objects provide the context that further determines the nature of the
function or goal that are performed by the coordinated clusters. Autopoiesis (Mat-
urana and Varela, 1980) is perhaps the most illustrative example of a self-organized
coordination. Remarkably, autopoeisis is a function that operates in relation to
the same cluster of agents that realizes it and therefore does not require an outside
observer for its definition. Functional compatibility is not limited to this family
of self-determined functions. Coordinated clusters may emerge in response to sig-
nals mediated by the value system (see 4.2) that are external to the population of
agents under consideration. Such signals guide selection by providing an external
criterion of functional efficacy. In other words, the actual compatibility criterion
of coordination may be either self-produced or external. The emergent agents, ac-
cordingly, may be self-coordinating or coordinated in relation to an external state
of affairs. For an overview of coordination mechanisms see Heylighen (2013).
Though this short list of criteria seem to cover a very wide range of individuating
processes it is not necessarily exhaustive. Novel understandings of compatibility may
emerge in the course of an open-ended cognitive development process. However, we see
no problem over incorporating such future developments into our model. On top of
the criteria of compatibility we identify additional criteria under the general title value
modulating system, or in short, value system. Values are not used explicitly in selection.
Instead, they operate by modulating the plasticity of connections and by that quicken
or slowdown the selective processes. The value system and its importance is further
discussed in 4.2.
Reflexive mutual selection
In our generative model, individuated entities are the product of a recursive resolution of
incompatibilities. This is a process of reciprocal selection where agents within a popula-
tion repeatedly select communication links and interactions that increase compatibility
12By incorporating various selective criteria, our approach to synthetic cognitive development suggests a
unifying ground to both connectionist and symbolic models of intelligence. We see this as a promising
prospect for further research.
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according to the criteria outlined above. The reinforcement of compatible interactions
and suppression of incompatible interactions progressively determine clusters of inte-
grated agents within the population. Structural changes in the network of agents drive
further selections and this transductive activity continues until the network achieves
relative stability as individuated super-agents consolidate. At this elementary level, in-
dividuals emerge as products of an evolutionary process: the heterogeneity of agents
in population P provides the variation and the various compatibility criteria provide
the selective elements of the process. The retention of compatible clusters is inherent
in the process since by definition mutual compatibility among agents is preferred and
reinforced. Otherwise, no individuation and no cognitive development could have taken
place.
Inspired by Edelman’s theory of neuronal group selection (Edelman, 1987; Edelman
and Gally, 2013; Tononi et al., 1992) the reflexive and recursive characteristics lie at the
basis of our generative model. Our model extends neuronal group selection to general
networks of agents. The selective criteria of compatibility that we derive from the theory
of individuation extends the synchronization criterion in the case of neuronal groups.
Reflexive mutual selection (termed ‘reentry’ by Edelman) is a mechanism operating
within a network of interacting agents. Consider two groups of agents A and B. Each
group contains similar agents with some variety in their pattern of behavior. The groups
are interconnected internally and across. Following a signal produced by some agent in
group A, a subset of agents in group B will respond by producing signals too. This
activation will spread both internally in B and across back to A (where some of the
agents are already active too). A subset of agents in A will respond to the signals
coming from B such that a chain reaction of signals will propagate back and forth
between A and B. In some cases, after a few cycles of exchange, a signal, whether from
an agent in B or A, will be received by the initiating agent and will cause it to produce
a signal similar to the one that initiated the whole exchange. If this happens, a closed
activation loop begins and the groups will enter a period of sustained mutual activation
that will continue until it is disrupted by other signals.13 Sustained activation patterns
and sequences of interactions that arise in a similar manner within the population of
agents are the products of what we call a reflexive mutual selection process.
13The description here is simplified for the purpose of illustration. Sustained activation patterns may
arise in many other, more complex ways.
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Figure 4: Two connected groups A and B and the formation of sustained mutual activation. The signal prop-
agation path of the sustained activation is indicated in red. Other paths such as A3-B1-B2-A5-A3
are topologically possible but are not selected because activation depends also on the informational
content and timing.
4.2 Value modulating systems
In the context of the cognitive development of the human mind, value systems hold a
potential to describe the mechanism of emotional influence on cognitive states, which is
increasingly seen as a pivotal component of cognition. Pessoa (2009) points out: “His-
torically, emotion and cognition have been viewed as largely separate. In the past two
decades, however, a growing body of work has pointed to the interdependence between
the two”. Fellous (2004, 1999) argues that neuromodulatory systems are the basis for
emotions. In summary, emotional regulation is an important aspect of cognitive devel-
opment (see 1.5). We therefore assign to value systems a critical regulatory role in our
model.
In the enactive theory of cognition, Di Paolo et al. (2010) offer a definition for value as
“the extent to which a situation affects the viability of a self-sustaining and precarious
network of processes that generates an identity.” Moreover, they emphasize a strong
relation to the concept of sense-making: “value is simply an aspect of all sense-making,
as sense-making is, at its root, the evaluation of the consequences of interaction for the
conservation of an identity.” Values are assigned to situations but they emerge from
interactions as aspects of sense-making or, in other words, values emerge in the course of
cognitive development. In the context of our research program we aim to examine how
values and value systems develop. Particularly, the relations between built-in values and
emergent values in the process of individuation at any given scale.
In the neuroscientific context Friston et al. (1994, p. 2) take an evolutionary approach:
“The value of a global pattern of neuronal responses to a particular envi-
ronmental situation (stimulus) is reflected in the capacity of that response
pattern to increase the likelihood that it will recur in the same context. In
this respect, value is analogous to ‘adaptive fitness’ in evolutionary selection,
where the adaptive fitness of a phenotype is defined in terms of its propensity
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to be represented in subsequent generations. Thus, value plays a role in neu-
ronal selection similar to that which adaptive fitness plays in evolutionary
selection.”
Friston et al. highlight the role of values as mediating evolutionary knowledge sig-
nificant to fitness and already proven survival strategies. Cognitive development will
accordingly be guided by values built-in by evolution. This approach assumes certain
abstract principles (e.g. “food is good”) that are independent of interaction and exist
a priori to individuation. Di-Paolo et al. argue against this approach as a case of “[...]
dealing with pre-factum evolutionary teleonomy, not with autonomy” and further ex-
plain that “[t]he point is not to argue that such norms do not exist across individuals
[...], but rather that they should be searched for on the emergent level of autonomous
interaction, not on the level of mechanism.” We go a step further to argue that the
emergent level mentioned by Di Paolo et al. extends beyond the individual (i.e. the
autonomous entity) into the process of individuation.
But the gap between these approaches may be merely superficial. According to Friston
et al., the structural and functional properties of the value systems needed for guiding
neuronal selection should: (1) “be responsive to evolutionary or experientially salient
cues” i.e. a wide context; (2) “broadcast their responses to wide areas of the brain and
release substances that can modulate changes in synaptic strength”; (3) be “capable of a
transient response to sustained input, inasmuch as it is changes in circumstances (envi-
ronmental or phenotypic) that are important for successful adaptation”. Value systems
allow for the integration of broad contextual information in driving selective processes.
(Friston et al., 1994) note however that a value is equivalent to an adaptive fitness in
the evolutionary sense which guides, but does not determine, the further development
of the organism.
In our model, we frame value systems in a broader framework of scalable individuation.
We accommodate pre-determined norms in the dynamic construction of significance by
individuals interacting in their environment. We argue that value modulating systems
offer mechanisms of upward and downward causation which mediate among the various
scales of the cognitive system (see Figure 2). Values at a specific scale S operate as
guiding signals originating from both the lower scale S − 1 and the higher scale S + 1.
In both cases they modulate the operation of agents within the population Ps. Values
that originate from lower scales can be viewed as built-in but they cannot be said to
operate at the same domain of interactions characteristic to scale S. Every scale is a
new layer of mediation whereby the possibilities to create meaning for signs become less
constrained by the values of lower scales 14.
Synthetic cognitive development starts from explicit presuppositions and constraints
which provide the basis for the generative process. These presuppositions define the
primary repertoire of structures available for further cognitive development e.g. eyes,
ears, pain receptors with their related neural structures in the case of mammals. Like-
wise, our notion of a value system starts from some presuppositions and constraints i.e.
14See (Di Paolo et al., 2010, pp. 48-52) for a more detailed discussion that supports this approach.
27
‘innate values’ that provide the initial structures. Value systems, then, undergo individ-
uation along with the whole cognitive system. Friston et al. (1994, p. 10) demonstrated
that value systems allow for unsupervised acquisition of new values in cases where they
predict behaviors related to innate ones15. Following this, we hypothesize that similar
mechanisms can be applied generally, meaning that novel sets of values are recursively
acquired based on previously established ones. The specific characterization and imple-
mentation of such mechanisms is the subject of future research.
Presuppositions and constraints are necessary for modeling concrete instances of the
cognitive development process. We nevertheless adhere to the perspective that the gen-
eral cognitive development scheme based on the theory of individuation is not funda-
mentally constrained by any particular set of such presuppositions. Individuation as a
formative process spans across scales beginning with natural evolution and going as far
as open-ended intelligence expansion in humans, human organizations and machines.
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